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This paper presents a model where individuals have imperfect information and there is
an opportunity cost of learning. It shows that the endogenous decision to collect costly
information before taking an action has a systematic eﬀect on choices. More precisely,
consider two alternatives with ex ante identical expected payoﬀ but diﬀerent variances.
The model predicts that, after the learning process is stopped, a majority of individuals will
select the alternative with largest payoﬀ-variance. The result persists when agents have
multiple sources of information. Applications to entrepreneurial investments, composition
of advisory committees, and judicial decision-making are discussed.1 Motivation
Empirical studies show a high rate of failure in new businesses (for data, see e.g. Camerer
and Lovallo (1999) and the references there-in). Explanations based on hit-and-run strate-
gies or a skewed distribution of proﬁts with positive expected returns can rationalize the
willingness of entrepreneurs to engage in these high-risk, low-probability activities. The
literatures in psychology and behavioral ﬁnance argue, on the contrary, that a rational
cost-beneﬁt analysis fails short to explain these choices. These theories claim that an
“irrational” tendency to optimism and overconﬁdence (loosely deﬁned as an individual
holding an excessively positive belief in his capabilities or chances of success) provides a
more accurate account for this behavioral tendency.1 It is this same irrational belief that
pushes researchers to pursue adventurous innovation strategies.
The present paper discusses a diﬀerent and possibly complementary force for this ob-
served tendency to engage in high risk enterprises. We consider individuals with imperfect
knowledge about the environment (or about themselves) who choose between alternatives
with ex ante identical expected payoﬀs but diﬀerent risks. We argue that if learning is
feasible but sequential and costly, then the endogenous decision to collect information gen-
erates in a population of rational individuals a systematic and testable tendency to favor
the alternatives characterized by highest risk. Stated diﬀerently, the paper shows that, in
settings where the collection of information is dynamic and endogenous, a population of
rational individuals display an aggregate form of behavior which may look like driven by
irrational beliefs. Naturally, we do not argue that imperfect knowledge and endogenous
information acquisition provide an explanation for all the choices documented above. In
that respect, the paper just adds one new element to the discussion: risky decisions may be
favored not because of irrational beliefs and cognitive limitations but because of rational
learning and an option value argument.
To illustrate our theory, consider the following stylized example. Two risk-neutral
1entrepreneurs must decide between two investment strategies. The preferences of these
entrepreneurs are identical in most respects. In particular, for any given belief about the
relative chances of success of these investments, not only they both prefer to undertake
the same one, but they also incur the same utility loss if the other investment is selected.
There is, however, one subtle diﬀerence: the ﬁrst investment strategy is more risky for
one entrepreneur whereas the second strategy is more risky for the other. This diﬀer-
ence in risks may reﬂect, for example, the fact that entrepreneurs start with diﬀerent
core activities. Pursuing a strategy that builds on existing technology or competence is
intrinsically less risky than giving up the current technology or competence in order to
pursue a radically new strategy. Entrepreneurs initially share the same belief regarding
the relative value of both strategies but they can independently acquire extra evidence
at the expense of postponing the investment decision. Finally, we assume that delay is
costly: the project may become obsolete or less valuable, and the proﬁts postponed are
discounted at a positive rate. Given the same starting belief and the identical behavior and
utility loss of both entrepreneurs for any given belief, one could think that their choices
would be indistinguishable in a stochastic sense. However, this intuition is incorrect: after
the information acquisition process, each entrepreneur will choose his more risky strategy
with higher probability than his less risky one, both when it is ex-post revealed to be the
best alternative and when it is ex-post revealed to be the worst one.
The key for the result lies in the opportunity cost of learning. Suppose that the
preliminary evidence points towards one of the investments. The opportunity cost of
sampling is greatest for the entrepreneur who derives highest payoﬀ if that investment is
chosen and turns out to be successful, that is, for the entrepreneur with highest payoﬀ
variance under this investment. This individual is then more tempted than the other
to stop the information acquisition process, and enjoy the high expected payoﬀ of his
(hopefully correct) decision. Overall, these two entrepreneurs would behave identically if
2the amount of information collected were exogenously ﬁxed. However, the asymmetry in
the total payoﬀ of making the right decision combined with the costly endogenous choice
of learning implies that, in expectation, they will end up choosing diﬀerent actions and
therefore committing diﬀerent investment errors. The reader may ﬁnd obvious that each
entrepreneur favors the investment that has the potential to yield highest payoﬀ. However,
one should realize that by adopting such strategy, entrepreneurs are also committing more
often the mistakes that are most costly.
The result has two immediate consequences for the design of advisory committees.
Suppose that a ﬁrm requests the opinion of several employees regarding the optimal in-
vestment strategy and aggregates the information. If, for some reason (related to proﬁt
maximization or not), the ﬁrm has a preference for a particular investment, it can increase
the probability that this investment is proposed simply by choosing advisors whose payoﬀ
variance is greatest for that investment. Perhaps more surprisingly, a ﬁrm concerned with
maximizing the probability of choosing the correct investment, will optimally select all
advisors of the same type. Thus, the systematic diﬀerences in choices (and errors) should
persist even when multiple sources of information are available.
Note that, because all agents are rational in our model, the amount of information
collected is always optimal. Costly learning implies that entrepreneurs decide without
being fully informed, and therefore make wrong choices with positive probability. Thus,
the systematic diﬀerences in choices and in the type of mistakes the entrepreneurs make
relates to their diﬀerent likelihood of choosing (rightly or wrongly) one investment or the
other, and not on whether they sample optimally. Also, the cost of acquiring information
is a delayed (and therefore discounted) payoﬀ and/or a probability of the project becoming
obsolete. In either case, it is proportional to the expected payoﬀ if sampling is stopped
and the action with highest expected payoﬀ undertaken. This is crucial as it implies
that the project with highest payoﬀ variance has also the highest opportunity cost of
3sampling. If, instead, we assumed a ﬁxed sampling cost, all entrepreneurs would choose
the diﬀerent investments with identical probabilities and the eﬀect highlighted in the paper
would disappear. Last, the paper discusses other applications such as research strategies
of ﬁrms, court judgments under civil law, and career choices.
Related literature The paper is related to two strands of the literature. First, to
the individual choice models developed independently by Zabojnik (2004), Van den Steen
(2004), Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005) and more recently Benoˆ ıt and Dubra (2007). These
works concentrate on a single activity that requires ability and show that agents may
perceive themselves as “better” than their objective ranking. The argument in Zabojnik
(2004) is based on an opportunity cost of learning (as in our paper) and an exogenous
utility function convex in ability. Under appropriate initial conditions on the discount
factor, the initial ability and the degree of convexity of the utility, only individuals with
an expected ability below a certain threshold experiment, generating the bias. In Van den
Steen (2004) and Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005) agents evaluate situations using diﬀerent
criteria: they are endowed with heterogeneous beliefs and heterogeneous preferences about
which skills are valuable, respectively. Agents can invest in an action or in improving
these skills. The key issue is that agents evaluate the skills of others according to their
own criteria rather than the criteria of others. This, again, generates a bias in self-
assessment. Benoˆ ıt and Dubra (2007) demonstrate that a prior distribution of beliefs and
a private signal impose very little statistical restrictions on a summary of the posterior
beliefs held in the population (e.g., whether their belief is above or below the x-percentile).
In particular, the authors ﬁnd an upper bound on the fraction of individuals who can rate
themselves above x% which is strictly greater than x for all x. Overall, these papers
explain why a majority of individuals may hold above average or even above median
beliefs concerning a certain positive trait. Our setting is diﬀerent in that our agents
choose between several alternatives. Although we share with these papers the result that
4one option will be systematically favored, our main goal is to explore the behavioral
consequences. In particular, we emphasize the role of the payoﬀ-variance of the diﬀerent
alternatives in determining the propensity of individuals to take diﬀerent actions and
therefore commit diﬀerent types of errors. We also argue the existence of a testable
relationship between delay and type of action undertaken. Finally, we show how this
systematic tendency to favor certain choices can be exploited by third parties.
Second, since we build a model of costly learning with an optimal stopping rule, the
paper can be seen as a particular application of optimal experimentation (see e.g. the
statistical literature on multi-armed bandits summarized in Berry and Fristedt (1985)).
There are two features that make our model diﬀerent from the main economic applications
studied in this literature. First, unlike in Bolton and Harris (1999) or Keller and Rady
(1999) for example, the agent does not decide at each date on which arm he experiments.
Instead, the decision to keep accumulating evidence produces a signal about the rela-
tive likelihood of each state. Second, most of this literature “highlights the fundamental
trade-oﬀ between the conﬂicting objectives of learning and obtaining high current pay-
oﬀs” (Aghion et al. (1991, p.623)). More precisely, by experimenting with one arm, the
agent obtains the payoﬀ associated with that alternative. Thus, he may choose a highly
informative arm with low expected payoﬀ in order to learn how to behave in the future.
In our paper, experimenting has a diﬀerent implicit cost: the discount factor applied to
the action eventually taken. It thus depends on the current belief about which action is
optimal and it is only borne when the experimentation process is stopped.
The plan of the paper is the following. We ﬁrst present a model in which a decision
maker has imperfect information about the state of nature and chooses between two (risky)
actions. We are particularly interested in the behavior of agents with “seemingly the same”
motivations. Two agents have the same motivations if, for any given belief, they share the
same diﬀerence in expected utility between the actions (section 2). We show that their
5diﬀerent incentives to acquire information aﬀects their behavior in systematically diﬀerent
ways (section 3). We also determine the eﬀect on third parties when actions generate
externalities (section 4). Last, we provide some concluding remarks (section 5).
2 The model
2.1 States, actions and utilities
We consider the following model. There are I types of agents in the economy (i ∈ I)
and two states of the world A and B denoted by s. Agents choose among a ﬁnite set of
irreversible actions γ ∈ Γ. The ex-post utility of a type-i agent is a function ui(γ,s) of
the action and the true state. For each state, there is one action that provides the highest
utility. Naturally, this action is selected if the state is known. However, agents initially
have imperfect knowledge about the state. More precisely, they share a common prior p
that the true state is A. The expected payoﬀ of taking action γ is:
ui(γ) = pui(γ,A) + (1 − p)ui(γ,B)
For expositional purposes, we will study a simpler version with only two actions Γ =
{a,b}. As we will develop in the discussion of our results, this restriction is made with
little loss of generality. Action a is optimal if the state is A and action b is optimal if
the state is B. Last and foremost, the variance in payoﬀs is diﬀerent across actions. To
capture this property, we assume that the utility representation for a type-i agent is:
ui(a,·) =
(
xi if s = A
−xi if s = B
and ui(b,·) =
(
−yi if s = A
yi if s = B
, (1)
with xi > 0 and yi > 0. This representation allows us to restrict the attention to the most
interesting cases where it is possible to compare the variances of the actions and to have
clear-cut results. Indeed, it is easy to see that when xi > yi, then action a has the highest
variance in payoﬀs.
62.2 Information
Before making a decision, each agent can learn about the likelihood of the states. We
denote by τi,t the decision of agent i at a given date t ∈ {0,1,...,T − 1}, where T is
ﬁnite but arbitrarily large. At each date, his options are either to take the optimal action
conditional on his current information (τi,t = γ ∈ {a,b}) or wait until the following period
(τi,t = w). If the agent undertakes an (irreversible) action, then payoﬀs are realized and
the game ends. Waiting has costs and beneﬁts. On the one hand, the delay implied by
the decision to wait one more period before acting is costly. We denote by δ (< 1) the
discount factor. Alternatively, 1−δ can be interpreted as the probability that all options
vanish, in which case the agent obtains no payoﬀ. On the other hand, the agent obtains
between dates t and t+1 one signal σ ∈ {α,β} imperfectly correlated with the true state.
Information improves the quality of the decision made by the agent. As long as the agent
waits, he keeps the option of undertaking action a or b in a future period, except at date T
where waiting is not possible anymore, so the agent’s options are reduced to τi,T ∈ {a,b}.2
The relation between signal and state is the following:
Pr[α | A] = Pr[β | B ] = θ and Pr[α | B ] = Pr[β | A] = 1 − θ,
where θ ∈ (1/2,1) captures the accuracy of information: as θ increases, the informational
content of a signal σ increases (when θ → 1/2 signals are uninformative, and when θ → 1
one signal perfectly informs the agent about the true state).3
Suppose that a number nα of signals α and a number nβ of signals β are revealed during
the nα +nβ periods in which the agent waits. Using standard statistical techniques, it is
possible to compute the agent’s posterior belief about the state:
Pr(A | nα,nβ) =
Pr(nα,nβ | A)Pr(A)
Pr(nα,nβ | A)Pr(A) + Pr(nα,nβ | B)Pr(B)
=
θnα−nβ · p
θnα−nβ · p + (1 − θ)nα−nβ · (1 − p)
7It is interesting to notice that the posterior depends exclusively on the diﬀerence between
the number of signals α and the number of signals β. So, roughly speaking, two diﬀerent
signals “cancel each other out” for the purpose of computing the expected belief. The
relevant variable which will be used from now on is n ≡ nα − nβ ∈ Z. We deﬁne the








Last, when solving the model, we will treat n as a real number (instead of an integer
as we should in order to be rigorous). This mathematical abuse is made for technical
convenience.
2.3 Types
Diﬀerent types of agents have diﬀerent preferences, which translate into diﬀerent cardinal
representations of their utility. From a general perspective, there are two cases. In some
situations, agents with the same belief simply disagree on the optimal action. They will
end up making diﬀerent choices both when they learn and when they choose between
actions. In some other situations, agents with the same belief agree on the action to
take. One objective of this paper is to show that they still might end up making diﬀerent
learning decisions and taking diﬀerent actions subsequently.
To focus on these second type of situations (see the next section for some examples), we
assume that for any given belief, all types of agents have the same diﬀerence in expected
utility between every pair of actions. This means not only that they have the same
preferred action when confronted to the same evidence, but also that they have the same
willingness to pay to make the decision. We will say that these diﬀerent types of agents
“for Identical Beliefs are Identical in Behavior and Utility Difference”
(ibibud). The property is summarized as follows.
8Deﬁnition Agents are ibibud if and only if:
ui(γ) − ui(γ0) = ui0(γ) − ui0(γ0) ∀ i,i0 ∈ I, γ,γ0 ∈ Γ, p
which, in particular, implies that argmax
γ ui(γ) ≡ argmax
γ ui0(γ) for all i,i0 ∈ I, p.
Given our simpliﬁed two-action model, it is suﬃcient to restrict to two types of agents:
action a has the highest variance in payoﬀs for type-1 agents and action b has the highest
variance in payoﬀs for type-2 agents. Let x1 = h and y1 = l with h > l, then, it is suﬃcient
to restrict to the case where x2 = l and y2 = h. The ibibud property translates into:
ui(a) − ui(b) = (h + l)(2p − 1) ∀ i ⇒ γi = a if p > 1/2 and γi = b if p < 1/2 ∀ i.
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Expected utility of type-1 agent.
Figure 1. Utility representations for type-1 and type-2 agents.
2.4 Examples
In our theory, an individual must eventually take an irreversible decision that is ex post
optimal only in one (ex ante unknown) state of the world. Information can be obtained
before making a choice at a cost. We brieﬂy review a series of situations in which those
ingredients are present.
9Entrepreneurial investments under uncertainty Our leading example is about
choice between diﬀerent risky investments. A ﬁrm must decide which investment strategy
to follow, a or b: the development of a product based on current know-how or one that
radically departs from it; an R&D strategy that builds on existing technology or one that
requires the development of a new technology; an investment that consolidates the exist-
ing costumer base or one that expands to a diﬀerent population; a product that exploits
complementarities with the existing portfolio or one that opens a new niche for the ﬁrm.
The ex ante unknown state of the economy, market conditions, and consumer preferences,
A or B, determine which investment will be relatively more successful. Finally, a choice
that involves diversiﬁcation is intrinsically more risky for a ﬁrm than one that builds on
core competence (existing vs. new knowledge, technology, customers or product). Because
ﬁrms in the same market have diﬀerent backgrounds, what is considered high risk for
one ﬁrm may be low risk for another and vice versa; the diﬀerence across types (1 or 2)
captures this heterogeneity.
Court judgements under civil law A judge must choose whether to release (action
a) or convict (action b) an oﬀender who is innocent (state A) with probability p and
guilty (state B) with probability 1 − p. The judge can acquire information about the
culpability of the accused at the cost of delaying the sentence. Letting the prisoner free is
the riskiest choice for a type-1 judge (payoﬀ u1(a,·) ∈ {−h,h}) whereas convicting him is
the riskiest choice for a type-2 judge (payoﬀ u2(b,·) ∈ {−h,h}). However, for any belief p,
the diﬀerential in utility between convicting and releasing the oﬀender is the same for both
judges (ibibud property). An alternative interpretation is that there is only one judge
and i represents the type of oﬀense (robbery, murder, etc.). For these diﬀerent oﬀenses,
conviction and acquittal involve diﬀerent objective risks.
10Career choices under imperfect self knowledge An adolescent chooses whether
to pursue a career in sports (a) or to continue his intellectual education (b). Success in
sports depends largely on “talent” (physical strength, coordination, performance under
pressure). States A and B denote respectively a person with high talent and low talent for
sport relative to his talent for intellectual activities. Training and repeated exposure to
the activity provides information at a cost. Indeed, each year of non-exclusive attention
decreases the long-run expected return in either domain. Last, earnings have a higher
variance in sports (h or −h) than in intellectual endeavors (l or −l). Thus, there is only
one relevant type in this application.
This example can be relabeled as an individual who decides whether to become an
entrepreneur and open his own business (the high risk activity) or accept a job as an
employee in a ﬁrm (low risk activity). Entrepreneurial talent is most valuable in new
business ventures whereas discipline and team spirit is most important when working in
a ﬁrm.
3 Information acquisition and optimal decision-making
A ﬁrst goal of our study is to determine how a type-i agent acquires information before
making a decision (section 3.1). Another objective is to compare the behavior of indi-
viduals with apparently similar motivations, that is, individuals who satisfy the ibibud
property (section 3.2). We want to determine whether they exhibit diﬀerent patterns
of information acquisition and, if so, why. We also want to analyze how these diﬀerent
sampling strategies aﬀect posterior beliefs (which measure the ex post conﬁdence in the
state) and actions. Then, we want to ﬁnd out which type of mistakes are eventually made:
how often action a is undertaken under state B, and action b under state A. The next
objective is to determine whether the preferences of agents can be inferred from choices,
the only observable variable (section 3.3). We also study what happens when we consider
11a diﬀerent cost of information acquisition (section 3.4). Finally, we discuss the importance
of the main ingredients of the model (section 3.5).
3.1 Option value of waiting and optimal stopping rule
Given the information revelation structure presented in section 2.2, agents face a trade-oﬀ
between delay and information. This trade-oﬀ has been analyzed in a related setting in
the literature on investment under uncertainty (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a
summary). In these models however, time is continuous and there is only one risky action
to take. Our model can thus be seen as an extension of this literature to the case where
two risky options are available. In this new setting and conditional on making a choice
now, the opportunity cost of taking one action is not ﬁxed anymore. This, in turn, also
aﬀects the option value of waiting.
In order to ﬁnd the optimal stopping rule, we ﬁrst determine the value function V t
i



























where ν(n) = µ(n)θ+(1−µ(n))(1−θ). In words, at date t and given a diﬀerence of signals
n that implies a posterior µ(n) > 1/2, type-i agent chooses between taking action a with
expected payoﬀ xiµ − xi(1 − µ) or waiting. In the latter case, signal α (respectively β)
is received with probability ν (respectively 1 − ν) and the value function in the following
period t + 1 becomes V t+1
i (n + 1) (respectively V t+1
i (n − 1)), discounted at the rate δ.
For µ(n) < 1/2, the argument is the same, except that the optimal action if the agent
does not wait is b with payoﬀ −yiµ + yi(1 − µ). Given (2), we can determine the optimal
strategy for each type. This technical result is key for the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 1 For all δ < 1, there exist (n∗
i,t,n∗∗
i,t) at each date t s.t.:
τi,t = b if n 6 n∗
i,t, τi,t = a if n > n∗∗
i,t and τi,t = w if n ∈ (n∗
i,t,n∗∗
i,t).
12Besides, we have µ(n∗
i,t) < 1/2 < µ(n∗∗
i,t).
Proof. See Appendix A1. 2
The idea is simple. Agents trade-oﬀ the costs of delaying their choice between actions
a and b with the beneﬁts of acquiring more accurate information. When µ(n) > 1/2,
waiting becomes more costly as n increases, because delaying the action one extra period
reduces the expected payoﬀ by an amount proportional to 2µ(n) − 1. Conversely, when
µ(n) < 1/2, waiting becomes more costly as n decreases, because delaying the action
reduces the expected payoﬀ by an amount proportional to 1 − 2µ(n). In other words,
at each date t, there are two cutoﬀs µ(n∗∗
i,t) > 1/2 and µ(n∗
i,t) < 1/2 for a type-i agent.
When µ > µ(n∗∗
i,t), the individual is “reasonably conﬁdent” that the true state is A, and
when µ 6 µ(n∗
i,t), he is “reasonably conﬁdent” that the true state is B. In either case, the
marginal gain of improving the information about the true state is oﬀset by the marginal
cost of a reduction in the expected payoﬀ due to the delay it implies. As a result, he
strictly prefers to stop learning and take his optimal action. For intermediate beliefs, that
is when µ(n) ∈ (µ(n∗
i,t),µ(n∗∗
i,t)), a type-i agent prefers to keep accumulating evidence.
3.2 Diﬀerent decisions by agents with the same motivations
In this section, we want to compare the behavior of ibibud agents. We consider the two
types we already introduced, that is, (x1 = h,y1 = l) and (x2 = l,y2 = h), with h > l.
Action a has the highest variance in payoﬀs for type-1 agents, whereas action b has the
highest variance in payoﬀs for type-2 agents. Our next result is the following.
Proposition 1 For all δ < 1 and for all t, type-1 agents require less evidence in favor of
A to take action a and more evidence in favor of B to take action b than type-2 agents.
Formally, µ(n∗
1,t) < µ(n∗
2,t) < 1/2 < µ(n∗∗
1,t) < µ(n∗∗
2,t).
Proof. See Appendix A1. 2
13First of all, note that by the symmetry of types 1 and 2, µ(n∗∗
1,t) = 1 − µ(n∗
2,t) and
µ(n∗
1,t) = 1 − µ(n∗∗
2,t). It immediately implies that:
µ(n∗∗
1,t) − 1/2 < 1/2 − µ(n∗
1,t) and µ(n∗∗
2,t) − 1/2 > 1/2 − µ(n∗
2,t).
These inequalities state that the conﬁdence of a type-1 agent on the true state being A
when he chooses to take action a is smaller than his conﬁdence on the true state being B
when he chooses to take action b. By symmetry, the opposite is true for a type-2 agent.
Comparing the two agents, it means that a type-1 agent will need fewer evidence in favor
of A in order to decide to stop collecting news and take action a and more evidence in
favor of B in order to stop collecting news and take action b than a type-2 agent. The
intuition for this result is simply that, given the delay associated with the accumulation
of evidence, the marginal cost of learning is proportional to the agent’s expected payoﬀ
of taking an action. Formally, for a type-1 individual, it is proportional to h(1 − δ) when
µ > 1/2 (action a) and to l(1 − δ) when µ < 1/2 (action b). As a result and other things
being equal, it is relatively less interesting to keep experimenting when the action currently
optimal is a rather than b. The argument for a type-2 agent is symmetric. The shape of
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Stopping rule for a type-1 agent.
Figure 2. Stopping rules for type-1 and type-2 agents.




i for all t. Denote by Pr(τi = γi | s) the
probability that a type-i individual eventually undertakes action γi (∈ {a,b}) when the
true state is s (∈ {A,B}). Also, let µ∗∗
i ≡ µ(n∗∗
i ) and µ∗
i ≡ µ(n∗
i). Then, the posterior
beliefs at the stopping rules are µ∗
1 and µ∗∗
1 for type-1 agents and µ∗
2 and µ∗∗
2 for type-2
agents. Given agents are symmetric, we have µ∗∗
2 = 1 − µ∗
1 and µ∗
2 = 1 − µ∗∗
1 . To simplify
notations, let µ∗∗ ≡ µ∗∗
1 and µ∗ ≡ µ∗
1 (then µ∗∗
2 = 1 − µ∗ and µ∗
2 = 1 − µ∗∗). Suppose
that type-1 and type-2 agents start with the same prior belief p ∈ (1 − µ∗∗,µ∗∗). Each
agent chooses the amount of information he collects before undertaking an action and the
signals obtained by the agents are independent. Their optimal stopping rule is given by
Lemma 1. We can compare the relative probabilities that each agent undertakes action a
and action b.
Proposition 2 For all p ∈ (1 − µ∗∗,µ∗∗), δ < 1, h > l > 0 and when T → ∞, type-
1 agents take action a wrongly more often than type-2 agents. Similarly, type-1 agents
take action b wrongly less often than type-2 agents. Moreover, as the diﬀerence in payoﬀs
between actions increases, the diﬀerence in behavior between types 1 and 2 increases.
Proof. The ﬁrst part of Proposition 2 is a direct consequence of µ(n∗∗




1). These inequalities imply that Pr(τ1 = a | B) > Pr(τ2 = a | B) and

























∂l < 0. Then
∂ Pr(τ1=a|s)




∂l < 0 <
∂ Pr(γ2=a|s)
∂l for all
s. These comparative statics fulﬁll the purpose of our analysis. However, for the reader
interested, the analytical expressions of the probabilities Pr(τi | s) are derived in Brocas
and Carrillo (2007, Lemma 1) for an initial prior p and exogenous stopping posteriors µ∗


















15Proposition 2 shows that, even if type-1 and type-2 agents are ibibud –and therefore
have intrinsically the same motivations– they will make systematically diﬀerent choices,
at least in a stochastic sense. As shown in Lemma 1, a type-1 agent is relatively more
likely to stop collecting news when the preliminary evidence points towards the optimality
of action a than when it points towards the optimality of action b (i.e., when the ﬁrst few
signals are mainly α rather than β). Stated diﬀerently, the evidence in favor of A needed
to induce a type-1 agent to take action a is smaller than the evidence in favor of B needed
to induce him to take action b. The opposite is true for a type-2 agent. As a result, in
equilibrium, a type-1 agent is more likely to take action a by mistake (i.e., when the true
state is B) and less likely to take action b by mistake (i.e., when the true state is A) than
a type-2 agent. Note that the endogenous choice to acquire information is crucial for this
result: by deﬁnition of ibibud, the two types of agents would take action a with the same
expected probability if the number of signals they receive were externally or exogenously
imposed. Also, as the diﬀerence in the variance of payoﬀs (h−l) increases, the likelihood
that the two agents behave diﬀerently also increases: type-1 takes more often action a by
mistake and less often action b by mistake whereas the opposite is true for type-2. Last,
the fact that type-1 agents are less likely to take action b when the state is A automatically
implies that they are more likely to take action a when the state is A. Thus, Proposition
2 can be best stated as “type-1 agents are more likely to take action a and less likely to
take action b, both rightly and wrongly, than type-2 agents.”
We now provide a simple numerical example to give an idea of the propensity of agents
to make diﬀerent types of mistakes. Consider the extreme situation in which h > 0 and
l → 0.7 From the proof of Proposition 2, the probability that a type-i agent makes the
wrong decision is:
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16A type-1 agent will never take action b mistakenly, and a type-2 agent will never take
action a mistakenly. Simple comparative statics about the likelihood of taking the wrong
action given a prior probability p and a stopping posterior µ∗∗ are illustrated in Figure 3.
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Pr(τ1 = a | B)
Pr(τ2 = b | A)
Figure 3. Frequency of mistakes by type-1 and type-2 agents.
Last, note that µ∗∗ is increasing in δ, and lim
δ→1
µ∗∗ = 1. As individuals become more
patient, they acquire more information and make fewer mistakes. If they are inﬁnitely
patient, the cost of waiting vanishes. It then becomes optimal for both types to be (almost)
perfectly informed before choosing any action, and there are (almost) no mistakes in
equilibrium.
3.3 Revealed preferences
Suppose only choices are observable. Do choices convey any information about the pref-
erences of agents? In principle, agents might end up making decisions for many diﬀerent
reasons and it might be diﬃcult to identify a clear relationship between preferences and
choices. Agents who often take action a might simply prefer that action. But, as our
theory suggests, a tendency to favor a certain action can also arise in the absence of such
strict preference. Overall, behavior is not a good indicator of preferences and a systematic
17tendency to behave in a certain way does not necessarily result from a bias in perceptions
or preferences.
Our analysis suggests however that observed choices can be sometimes informative
about the preferences of decision-makers. To be more precise, suppose that the individual
starts with a prior belief p = 1/2 and his preferences are known up to the true type. We
have the following result.
Proposition 3 Agents’ types can be partly inferred from (i) the decisions they reach; (ii)
the delay in making decisions; and (iii) the frequency of their mistakes.
First, we have shown in the previous section that the alternative that can potentially
yield highest payoﬀ (that is, the one with highest payoﬀ-variance) will be adopted more
often. In that case, it is possible to infer the preferences by observing the decisions of
agents. Type-1 agents will take action a more often than type-2 agents. Conversely,
type-2 agents will take action b more often than type-1 agents.
Second, given the optimal learning strategy and compared to type-2 agents, type-1
agents will reach more quickly the stopping rule commanding to take action a than the
stopping rule commanding to take action b. In other words, the alternative that can
potentially yield highest payoﬀ will be adopted not only more often but also more rapidly.
This positive relation between delay and type of decision can, in principle, be tested
empirically.
Finally, if the state is observable ex post, it is possible to determine whether a mistake
was made or not. The frequency of the mistakes can then be used to infer the type of
the agent. In our case, a type-1 agent is more often wrong than a type-2 agent when he
takes action a and less often wrong when he takes action b. Again, this prediction can be
empirically tested.
183.4 Robustness
A crucial ingredient for the results presented so far is our speciﬁc way of modelling the cost
of information acquisition. Because, delayed payoﬀs are discounted at a positive rate, the
opportunity cost of waiting is greater the bigger the expected payoﬀ of choosing an action.
So, for example, starting from p = 1/2 it is more costly to wait after one signal in favor of
the high-variance alternative than after one signal in favor of the low variance alternative.
Formally, the opportunity cost of stopping the sampling process is (1 − δ)h(2µ(1) − 1) in
the former case and (1 − δ)l(1 − 2µ(−1)) ≡ (1 − δ)l(2µ(1) − 1) in the latter. Naturally,
identical results would be obtained if, instead of a discount factor, we assumed that the
possibility of acting vanishes between two dates with probability p = 1 − δ.
By contrast, the results would not hold if the only cost of sampling was a ﬁxed per

























with c (> 0) denoting the cost per unit of sampling. Indeed, in Appendix A2 we show
that under this alternative speciﬁcation, the willingness to experiment is identical in the
low and high variance alternatives, so it is also identical for a type-1 and a type-2 agent.
The reason is simple. Sampling has a beneﬁt and a cost. The beneﬁt is the possibility of
ﬁnding enough information in support of the currently unfavored alternative that would
lead to a switch of action weighted by the incremental expected gain of implementing this
action reversal. Because of the ibibud property, this incremental gain is identical for both
types of agents. The cost is simply the amount to pay for extra information. With a ﬁxed
per unit fee c, this cost is also identical for both types of agents. If the cost and the beneﬁt
are the same, the optimal stopping rule is also the same.8
Since a ﬁxed cost aﬀects the total amount of sampling but not the relative propensity
19to experiment on each alternative, all our results survive when we combine the ﬁxed cost
described in this section with the opportunity cost developed in the main body of the paper.
For most applications, the cost of experimentation is likely to be a combination of delay,
probability of not being able to act in the future and per unit fee. The relative importance
of each of them will depend on the speciﬁc case. For example, in the investment application
acquiring information has two major costs: the project may become obsolete or may be
undertaken by a rival entrepreneur, and the proﬁts are delayed and therefore discounted.
By contrast, for judicial decision-making the most important cost is the time, eﬀort and
money spent in the collection of each piece of evidence. Finally, the cost of delaying the
choice between an intellectual and a sport career is a decrease in the probability of success
in either domain.
3.5 Discussion
To conclude this section, we brieﬂy discuss the importance of some other ingredients of
the model and some possible interpretations of the results.
It should be clear by now that agents in our model are not fooled, deceived or misled.
Contrary to the behavioral literature on optimism or overconﬁdence (see the references in
the introduction), our agents have no cognitive limitations that would lead to systematic
biases in their beliefs. Instead, they are rational; they accumulate and interpret signals in
a bayesian way, and choose optimally given their information. Diﬀerences in choices be-
tween the diﬀerent types of agents (and therefore in outcomes and in the type of mistakes
incurred) are solely due to diﬀerences in their marginal incentives to learn about the state
of the economy. In other words, in our paper the tendency to favor risky alternatives in
entrepreneurial endeavors after a small amount of evidence is a proﬁt-maximizing strat-
egy: the high risk and low chances of success are recognized, but the opportunity cost
of accumulating more evidence is too important. Technically, the point is very simple.
The endogenous decision to acquire information does not aﬀect the ﬁrst-order moment
20of beliefs. That is, the average belief in the population always coincides with the true
average. However, it may inﬂuence the higher-order moments. In particular, it can aﬀect
the skewness in the distribution of beliefs. Given a limited set of actions, two populations
whose distribution of beliefs have the same average but diﬀerent skewness will exhibit
diﬀerent aggregate behaviors.9
The model relies on irreversibility of actions or no learning after the decision is made.
Irreversibility is quite natural in the judicial example, but either assumption can be too
extreme in investment choices for example. Nevertheless, one should realize that partial
irreversibility is enough to generate a short-run tendency to favor the riskiest alternative.
Moreover, if the environment changes stochastically, information becomes obsolete over
time, preventing the agent from learning the state with certainty. In that case, the willing-
ness to favor risky choices will persist also in the long run, even under partial reversibility.
Geometrically, the utility of a type-2 agent is just a rotation of the utility of a type-1
agent (see Figure 1). It is then easy to see that the eﬀect of payoﬀ-variance in the delay
and likelihood of taking certain alternatives will hold if, keeping ibibud, we increase the
action space. From a theoretical viewpoint, it would be interesting to study a more general
version of this two armed bandit problem, as it could provide novel insights about the
relationship between the value of information and the “curvature” of the utility function.
4 Micro motives and macro consequences
We have argued in the previous sections that agents with the same motivations can end
up making diﬀerent choices, resulting in diﬀerent types of mistakes. In many contexts,
the decision might aﬀect other agents in the economy, and those agents might be more or
less sensitive to a given type of mistake. In the next subsections, we assess the mistakes
from the perspective of third parties when externalities are present.
214.1 Preferences over ibibud agents
Note that, in our model, agents select a stopping rule that increases the probability of
taking the action with highest payoﬀ. The other side of the coin is that, with this strategy,
agents are also increasing the probability of making the mistakes that are most costly.
Because the types of mistakes incurred are systematically diﬀerent, the parties involved
will invariably have preferences over which type of agent they prefer to face.
To analyze this point in more detail, let us consider a third party with preferences
summarized by the utility function v(γ,s). Also, let Pr(A) ≡ p ∈ (µ∗
i,µ∗∗
i ) and assume
that the third party does not pay the cost of learning (δ = 1). Given the stopping rule
used by a type-i agent, the expected utility of the third party is:
ˆ v(µ∗
i,µ∗∗
i ) = p
h































A simple inspection of this function yields the following result.
Proposition 4 Diﬀerent types of agents have diﬀerent eﬀects on the welfare of third par-
ties. In particular, (i) an ibibud third party with preferences of the form v(·,·) = u1(·,·)
or v(·,·) = u2(·,·) strictly prefers type-1 agents when p < 1/2 and type-2 agents when
p > 1/2; and (ii) third parties with a strict preference for an action can appoint a priori
unbiased agents to manipulate collective decision-making.

























. Then, if v(b,A) < v(a,A)
and v(b,B) < v(a,B), both derivatives are negative. Now let v(a,A) = x, v(a,B) = −x,
22v(b,A) = −y and v(b,B) = y, then ∂v
∂µ∗
i ∝ (x + y)(1 − 2µ∗∗
i ) < 0 and ∂v
∂µ∗∗
i ∝ (x + y)(1 −
2µ∗
i) > 0. Also,
ˆ v(µ∗
1,µ∗∗
1 ) ≡ ˆ V 1 = x(2µ∗∗ − 1)
p − µ∗





2 ) ≡ ˆ V 2 = x(1 − 2µ∗)
p − 1 + µ∗∗
µ∗∗ − µ∗ + y(2µ∗∗ − 1)
1 − µ∗ − p
µ∗∗ − µ∗
and ˆ V 1 − ˆ V 2 ∝ (1−2p)[1−µ∗∗ −µ∗]. For all p ∈ (1−µ∗∗,µ∗∗), we have 1−µ∗∗ −µ∗ > 0
and therefore ˆ V 1 − ˆ V 2 ≷ 0 if p ≶ 1/2. 2
The result is intuitive. Given that ibibud agents end up making diﬀerent choices and
therefore commit diﬀerent types of mistakes, they aﬀect third parties diﬀerently. Because
they do not have to pay the cost of learning, all third parties who care about taking the
correct action (a under A and b under B) want to learn the true state and therefore prefer
an agent who acquires as much information as possible. If third parties are also aﬀected by
the delay, an interior stopping rule becomes optimal also from their perspective. However,
even the extreme case where maximum information is optimal has an interesting property:
all third parties who care about taking the correct action and would take the same decision
as both types of agents for a given prior, have strict preferences over types. If the initial
belief suggests to take action a (p > 1/2), they all want to delegate the decision to a
type-2 agent. The reason is simply that they anticipate that a type-1 agent will stop
with little evidence towards state A and therefore take action a “too often.” The best
chance to discover action a is incorrect is to appoint a type-2 agent who will continue
learning until there is substantial evidence in favor of A. The same argument applies
when the initial belief suggests b is optimal. The implications for the investment example
described in section 2.4 are simple but interesting. For instance, consider a manager whose
preferences are represented by the utility function uk(γ,s) with k ∈ {1,2}. Suppose that
he must delegate both the information acquisition and the investment decision to one of his
employees whose preferences are represented by ui(γ,s). If the manager must compensate
23the employee for the sampling process, then it is trivially optimal to select an individual
with identical interests, i = k. This conclusion does not necessarily hold when the manager
does not compensate the employee for the information cost nor suﬀers if there is a delay. In
that case, the manager tries to maximize the information obtained before acting. This is
achieved by selecting an employee who is reluctant to stop in the state favored by the prior.
Summing up, a type-1 manager who initially believes that state A is more likely than B
ﬁnds it optimal to appoint an employee who stops with little evidence towards A (that is,
a type-1 agent) if the manager pays for the sampling cost. However, if the manager does
not pay for it, then he prefers to appoint an individual who samples relatively more given
the prior belief and therefore takes more often the optimal action (that is, a type-2 agent).
The second part of the proposition states that decisions can be manipulated if third
parties can choose the agents’ type. It is a direct consequence of Propositions 1 and 2.
If a third party wants action a to be taken independently of the state, it will optimally
delegate the decision to an agent who is most likely to take action a, that is, a type-1
agent. The implications are, again, immediate. A manager with a vested interest in one
particular action can impose his preferences with relatively high probability and, at the
same time, not be considered partisan: he simply needs to delegate the decision to an
employee whose payoﬀ variance is very high under the action preferred by the manager
and very low under the other action.
4.2 Committees
Another natural question is whether aggregating the information that ibibud individuals
can collect would alleviate mistakes. For instance, suppose that a welfare maximizing
principal can ask several type-1 and type-2 agents their opinion about which action a
or b should be taken. For simplicity, assume that agents care only about providing the
correct appraisal (whether their suggestion is followed by the principal or not) and that
their utility is captured with the functions ui(γ,s) described in section 2. This behavior is
24rational if, for example, appraisal and state are ex-post revealed and agents have career-
concerns: their payoﬀ is then a function of the quality of their suggestion, and not a
function of the ﬁnal action undertaken. In this setting, each agent’s optimal rule for the
acquisition of information coincides with the rule described in Lemma 1, so increasing the
number of agents can only decrease the probability of an incorrect decision.10 We assume
that the number of agents is ﬁxed but the principal can choose the proportion of type-1
and type-2 agents. Given that the two types of agents commit systematically diﬀerent
errors, we want to determine whether it is optimal to select all agents of the same type or
to have appraisals from agents of both types. In other words, we are interested in studying
the optimal composition of an advisory committee, and we ask the following question: is
it better to be surrounded by individuals who tend to favor the same or opposite actions?
To address this issue, we consider the simplest version of our model. We denote by
γ
j
i the recommendation made by the jth type-i agent. We suppose that l → 0, so that
Pr(γ
j
1 = b | A) = 0 and Pr(γ
j
2 = a | B) = 0 for all j. The total number of agents is
ﬁxed and equal to n. The principal chooses x, the number of type-1 agents, n − x being
the number of type-2 agents. Last, in order to avoid any exogenous reason to prefer one
type of agent over another, we assume that the principal’s sole concern is to minimize
the probability of a mistake, i.e., v(a,A) = v(b,B) > v(a,B) = v(b,A). If we denote by
γP ∈ {a,b} the action taken eventually by the principal, we have the following result.
Proposition 5 If p < 1/2, then x = n. The principal chooses γP = a if γ
j
1 = a ∀j and








If p > 1/2, then x = 0. The principal chooses γP = b if γ
j
2 = b ∀j and γP = a







and Pr(γP = a | B) = 0.
Proof. Fix x. Given l → 0, we have Pr(γ1 = b | A) = 0 and Pr(γ2 = a | B) = 0, so the
only possible error arises when all type-1 agents announce γ
j
1 = a (j ∈ {1,...,x}) and all
25type-2 agents announce γk
2 = b (k ∈ {1,...,n − x}). The remaining question is whether, if
this happens, the principal will take action a or action b.
Suppose that the principal minimizes costs with γP = a. The expected loss is then:
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So, conditional on taking γP = a, the principal optimally sets x = n, and the loss is:








Suppose that the principal minimizes costs with γP = b. The expected loss is then:
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⇔ p ≶ 1/2. 2
Proposition 5 states that a principal who can choose the source of information will not
select a combination of the two types of agents in order to compensate for the diﬀerent
type of errors they are likely to make. Instead, it will be optimal to choose all agents of
the same type. As a result, the systematic tendency to favor one action over others is
still present with a committee of advisors. The type of mistakes incurred will be identical
in nature to the single agent case developed before, but quantitatively smaller due to the
greater total amount of information collected. The idea is simple. Since the principal
dislikes equally both types of errors, he selects agents so as to minimize their likelihood
of committing a mistake, independently of the nature. We know from Proposition 2 that
the likelihood of providing an incorrect appraisal is inversely proportional to the distance
between the prior belief and the posterior at which the agent decides to stop collecting
evidence and recommends an action (formally, µ∗∗−p for a type-1 agent and p−(1−µ∗∗)
26for a type-2 agent). Hence, if p < 1/2, type-1 agents are relatively less likely to mislead
the principal than type-2 agents (|µ∗∗ − p| > |p − (1 − µ∗∗)|), so it is optimal to pick
only type-1 agents. The opposite is true when p > 1/2. Overall, fewer mistakes occur
as we increase the number of agents who provide an appraisal. However, the systematic
tendency to favor one decision persists. Note that the result is based on the idea that,
in order to minimize errors, the principal must encourage the acquisition of information.
This is achieved by choosing agents with highest incentives to experiment given the initial
prior. In that respect, the conclusion is similar to the one obtained in Proposition 4(i).
Again, the result has interesting implications for the examples presented before. Con-
sider a manager who can appoint a committee of agents in charge of providing independent
advice on which investment strategy to follow. Proposition 5 shows that in order to reduce
the number of mistakes, all members of the committee should have the same tastes (i.e.,
similar preferences that result in similar tendencies).11 Similarly, suppose that a judge
has to form a jury and assume that, for a given belief, all members agree on whether the
suspect should be convicted or released. The composition of the jury that minimizes mis-
takes will require all members to be of the same type, and therefore it will still exhibit a
systematic tendency to favor one alternative. This, in turn, implies that impartial verdicts
(that is, a verdict that errs on both sides with equal probability) are diﬃcult to render
even when all members want to minimize mistakes.
5 Concluding remarks
The paper has explored a general distinction between (irrational) systematically biased
beliefs and (rational) systematically favored choices that result from the endogenous and
costly decision to acquire information. We have pointed out as our major conclusion that
actions with highest variance in payoﬀs across states will generally be favored, at the ex-
pense of actions with lowest variance in payoﬀs across states. In some applications (e.g.,
27R&D strategies by diﬀerent ﬁrms or career choices), the payoﬀs of the diﬀerent alter-
natives are likely to be endogenously determined and inversely related to the fraction of
agents who choose the same option. Adding this general equilibrium element and studying
whether this possibility increases or decreases the tendency to favor certain alternatives is
an interesting extension left for future work.
The conclusion can be of interest for the debate on rationality in decision-making.
Consider an individual who chooses between opening a business and working in a ﬁrm.
The paper argues that a rational individual will be satisﬁed with little information in favor
of high entrepreneurial skills before deciding to open his own business. By contrast, he will
need substantial evidence of high team spirit and little entrepreneurial ability in order to
decide to work in a ﬁrm. As a result, we will observe many more low ability entrepreneurs
who start businesses (and thus fail) than high ability ones who work for others. Since
ability is not observable (only choices are), this asymmetry in choices and failures may
incorrectly lead to the conclusion that a majority of individuals have “excessive” conﬁdence
in their entrepreneurial skills.
At the same time, it would be absurd to pretend that our explanation can account for
all the evidence of overconﬁdence and optimism documented in psychology and behavioral
economics. First, because the ingredients of our model are not relevant in all settings.12
Second, because some aggregate beliefs are impossible to reconcile with statistical infer-
ence. And third, because the behavioral explanations reviewed in the introduction seem
to do a good job in many situations. Yet, we feel that adding this extra element to the
discussion can be very useful if we want to improve our understanding of the reasons and
situations in which individuals distort their choices.
28Notes
* We thank Joel Sobel, Jano Zabojnik, an editor, two anonymous referees and the
audiences at various seminars for helpful comments.
1See e.g. DeBondt and Thaler (1995) for evidence of managerial optimism and Camerer
and Lovallo (1999) for support of this hypothesis in a controlled laboratory environment.
Studies also show that optimists can drive realists out of the market (Manove, 1999), that
their presence may be socially desirable (Bernardo and Welch, 2001), and that optimistic
beliefs can maximize felicity (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005).
2A ﬁnite horizon game ensures the existence of a unique stopping rule at each period
that can be computed by backward induction. By setting T arbitrarily large we can
determine the limiting properties of this optimal stopping rule.
3It is equivalent to increase the correlation between signal and state or to increase the
number of signals between two dates; both can be captured with the parameter θ.





µ(n) = 1, and (iii) µ(n + 1) > µ(n) ∀n.
5Because some payoﬀs are negative, an individual with negative expected utility would
prefer to delay the outcome. This counter-intuitive possibility does not arise in our model
since, under the optimal action (a if p > 1/2 and b if p < 1/2), the expected payoﬀ is
always non-negative. In any case, all the results and proofs immediately extend if we
add a constant k (> h) to all utilities, making every payoﬀ positive (that is, u1(a,A) =
k + h,u1(a,B) = k − h,u1(b,B) = k + l,u1(b,A) = k − l and similarly for u2(·)).
6The paper uses related techniques to study a diﬀerent issue. It analyzes a princi-
pal/agent model with incomplete contracting and determines the rents obtained by the
former due to his ability to control the ﬂow of public information.
7This means that n∗
1 → −∞, n∗∗
2 → +∞ and therefore µ∗ → 0. The assumption is
by no means necessary. However, it allows us to make clear-cut comparative statics with
29only two parameters (p and µ∗∗).
8With asymmetric payoﬀs, one of the alternatives would have an exogenous advantage.
In particular, the belief where the individual is indiﬀerent between actions a and b would
be ˆ p 6= 1/2. The stopping rule with a cost per unit of sampling would still be symmetric,
but only with respect to the belief ˆ p.
9This point was ﬁrst made by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) in a model with hyperbolic
discounting agents and a costless learning technology. It has been recently exploited by
Benoˆ ıt and Dubra (2007) in a diﬀerent context.
10By contrast, if individuals were rewarded as a function of the quality of the ﬁnal
decision, then they would integrate the behavior of other agents in their choice to acquire
information (and, possibly, free-ride). The optimal stopping rule would then be modiﬁed
and it would not be always true that increasing the number of agents improves the quality
of the ﬁnal decision.
11The result however should not be overemphasized because the analysis neglects many
important issues in the selection of committee members. For example, diversity may be
optimal when diﬀerent opinions in agents with common goals are due to diﬀerent sources
of information.
12Among other things, stakes have to be suﬃciently small, otherwise the incentives of
individuals to become perfectly informed before choosing their optimal action will crowd-
out all other motivations (think for example of a patient deciding whether to learn from
the doctor his health state concerning a curable disease). Also, incomplete information
and costly learning have to be crucial elements at play.
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32Appendix A1: Proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1
Type-i agent.
Date T. Denote V T
i (n) = max{xi(2µ(n) − 1);yi(1 − 2µ(n))} and let:
Y t
i (n) = V t
i (n) − xi(2µ(n) − 1) and Wt
i (n) = V t
i (n) − yi(1 − 2µ(n)).
For t = T, we have Y T
i (n) = max{0;(xi + yi)(1 − 2µ(n))} and WT
i (n) = max{0;(xi +
yi)(2µ(n) − 1)}. Since µ(n) is increasing in n, WT
i (n) is non-decreasing and Y T
i (n) is
non-increasing in n. Besides, limn→+∞ µ(n) = 1 and limn→−∞ µ(n) = 0, so there exists
n deﬁned by µ(n) = 1/2 such that for all n > n then τi,T = a, and for all n < n then
τi,T = b.
Date T − 1.
Case-1: n > n. V T−1
i (n) = max{xi(2µ(n) − 1);δν(n)V T
i (n + 1) + δ(1 − ν(n))V T
i (n − 1)}
and
Y T−1
i (n) = max{0,−(1 − δ)xi(2µ(n) − 1) + δν(n)Y T
i (n + 1) + δ(1 − ν(n))Y T
i (n − 1)}
where Y T−1
i (n) is deﬁned on (n,+∞). Since ν(n) is increasing in n and Y T
i (n) is non-
increasing in n, we can check that the right-hand side (r.h.s.) of Y T−1
i (n) is decreasing in
n, and therefore there exists a cutoﬀ n∗∗
i,T−1 such that for all n > n∗∗
i,T−1 then τi,T−1 = a,
and for all n ∈ [n,n∗∗
i,T−1) then τi,T−1 = w. To solve the previous equation, the cutoﬀ has
to be such that n∗∗
i,T−1 + 1 > n and n∗∗
i,T−1 − 1 < n, and therefore it is the solution of:
0 = xi · f(n∗∗




i,T−1) − 1 − δν(n∗∗
i,T−1)(2µ(n∗∗






























i,T−1,δ) − xi · fn(n∗∗
i,T−1,δ)
i
= xi · fδ(n∗∗
i,T−1,δ) − yi · gδ(n∗∗
i,T−1,δ)
33Given f(n∗∗
i,T−1,δ) > 0, g(n∗∗
i,T−1,δ) > 0,14 yi · gn(n∗∗
i,T−1,δ) − xi · fn(n∗∗
i,T−1,δ) < 0, xi ·
fδ(n∗∗
i,T−1,δ) − yi · gδ(n∗∗













Case-2: n 6 n. V T−1
i (n) = max{yi(1 − 2µ(n));δν(n)V T
i (n + 1) + δ(1 − ν(n))V T
i (n − 1)}
and
WT−1
i (n) = max{0,−(1 − δ)yi(1 − 2µ(n)) + δν(n)WT
i (n + 1) + δ(1 − ν(n))WT
i (n − 1)}
where WT−1
i (n) is deﬁned on (−∞,n). Since ν(n) is increasing in n and WT
i (n) is non-
decreasing in n, we can check that the r.h.s. of WT−1
i (n) is increasing in n, and therefore
there exists a cutoﬀ n∗
i,T−1 such that for all n ∈ (n∗
i,T−1,n] then τi,T−1 = w, and for
all n < n∗
i,T−1 then τi,T−1 = b. This cutoﬀ has to be such that n∗
i,T−1 + 1 > n and
n∗
i,T−1 − 1 ≤ n, so it is solution of:
0 = yi · r(n∗




































i,T−1,δ) − xi · sn(n∗
i,T−1,δ)
i
= xi · sδ(n∗
i,T−1,δ) − yi · rδ(n∗
i,T−1,δ)
Given s(n∗
i,T−1,δ) > 0, r(n∗
i,T−1,δ) > 0, yi · rn(n∗
i,T−1,δ) − xi · sn(n∗
i,T−1,δ) < 0, xi ·
sδ(n∗
i,T−1,δ) − yi · rδ(n∗













The proof is completed using a simple recursive method.15
Case-1: n > n. V t−1




i (n) = max{0,−(1 − δ)xi(2µ(n) − 1) + δν(n)Y t+1
i (n + 1) + δ(1 − ν(n))Y t+1
i (n − 1)}
Y t−1
i (n) = max{0,−(1 − δ)xi(2µ(n) − 1) + δν(n)Y t
i (n + 1) + δ(1 − ν(n))Y t
i (n − 1)}
34Suppose that the following assumptions (A1)-(A5) hold.
(A1): Y t
i (n) is non-increasing in n and there exists n∗∗
i,t such that τi,t = a if n > n∗∗
i,t and
τi,t = w if n ∈ [n,n∗∗
i,t).
(A2): Y t
i (n) > Y t+1




i (n,xi) 6 Y t
i (n,x0
i) if xi > x0
i (and therefore ∂n∗∗
i,t/∂xi < 0).
(A4): Y t
i (n,yi) > Y t
i (n,y0
i) if yi > y0
i (and therefore ∂n∗∗
i,t/∂yi > 0).
(A5): Y t
i (n,δ) > Y t
i (n,δ0) if δ > δ0 (and therefore ∂n∗∗
i,t/∂δ > 0).
Given (A1), the r.h.s. of Y t−1
i (n) is decreasing in n, so Y t−1
i (n) is non-increasing in n.
Therefore, there exists a unique cutoﬀ n∗∗
i,t−1 such that for all n > n∗∗
i,t−1 then τi,t−1 = a,
and for all n ∈ [n,n∗∗
i,t−1) then τi,t−1 = w. Also, given (A2), the r.h.s. of Y t−1
i (n) is greater
or equal than the r.h.s. of Y t
i (n) and therefore Y t−1
i (n) > Y t
i (n). Overall, both (A1) and















By (A3), if xi > x0
i then Y t
i (n + 1,xi) 6 Y t
i (n + 1,x0
i) and Y t
i (n − 1,h) 6 Y t
i (n − 1,x0
i).
Therefore, Y t−1
i (n,h) 6 Y t−1
i (n,x0
i). This means that (A3) holds at date t − 1 and, as a
consequence, that ∂n∗∗
i,t−1/∂xi < 0. Using a similar reasoning, it is immediate that (A4)
and (A5) also hold at t − 1 and therefore that ∂n∗∗
i,t−1/∂yi > 0 and ∂n∗∗
i,t−1/∂δ > 0.





i (n) = max{0,−(1 − δ)yi(1 − 2µ(n)) + δν(n)Wt+1
i (n + 1) + δ(1 − ν(n))Wt+1
i (n−1)}
Wt−1
i (n) = max{0,−(1 − δ)yi(1 − 2µ(n)) + δν(n)Wt
i (n + 1) + δ(1 − ν(n))Wt
i (n − 1)}
Suppose that the following assumptions (A1’)-(A5’) hold.
(A1’): Wt
i (n) is non-decreasing in n and there exists n∗
i,t such that τi,t = b if n < n∗
i,t and
τi,t = w if n ∈ (n∗
i,t,n].
(A2’): Wt
i (n) > Wt+1




i (n,xi) 6 Wt
i (n,x0
i) if xi > x0
i (and therefore ∂n∗
i,t/∂xi < 0).
(A4’): Wt
i (n,yi) > Wt
i (n,y0
i) if yi > y0
i (and therefore ∂n∗
i,t/∂yi > 0).
35(A5’): Wt
i (n,δ) > Wt
i (n,δ0) if δ > δ0 (and therefore ∂n∗
i,t/∂δ < 0).
Given (A1’), the r.h.s. of Wt−1
i (n) is increasing in n, so Wt−1
i (n) is non-decreasing in
n. Therefore, there exists a unique cutoﬀ n∗
i,t−1 such that for all n < n∗
i,t−1 then τi,t−1 = b,
and for all n ∈ (n∗
i,t−1,n] then τi,t−1 = w. Also, given (A2’), the r.h.s. of Wt−1
i (n) is
greater or equal than the r.h.s. of Wt
i (n) and therefore Wt−1
i (n) > Wt
i (n). Overall, both














By (A3’), if xi > x0
i then Wt
i (n+1,xi) 6 Wt
i (n+1,x0
i) and Wt




i (n,xi) 6 Wt−1
i (n,x0
i). This means that (A3’) holds at date t − 1 and,
as a consequence, that ∂n∗
i,t−1/∂xi < 0. Using a similar reasoning, it is immediate that
(A4’) and (A5’) also hold at t−1 and therefore that ∂n∗
i,t−1/∂yi > 0 and ∂n∗
i,t−1/∂δ < 0.
Type-1 and Type-2 agents.
Type-1 and type-2 agents are fully symmetric. At date t, there exists n∗∗
1,t s.t. τ1,t = a if
n > n∗∗
1,t and τ1,t = w if n ∈ [n,n∗∗
1,t). There also exists n∗
2,t s.t. τ2,t = b if n < n∗
2,t and
τ2,t = w if n ∈ (n∗
2,t,n]. Furthermore, by symmetry, n∗




1,t) = 1 − µ(n∗
2,t). Similarly, if at date t there exists n∗
1,t s.t. τ1,t = b if n < n∗
1,t
and τ1,t = w if n ∈ (n∗
1,t,n], then there also exists n∗∗
2,t s.t. τ2,t = a if n > n∗∗
2,t and τ2,t = w if
n ∈ [n,n∗
2,t). Furthermore, n∗∗
2,t is such that n∗∗
2,t−n = n−n∗
1,t, that is µ(n∗
1,t) = 1−µ(n∗∗
2,t).





As a result, n∗
2,t = n∗
1,t < n and n∗∗
2,t = n∗∗
1,t > n. Also, we know that
∂n∗∗
1,t




(which, again by symmetry, implies that
∂n∗
2,t
∂h > 0 and
∂n∗∗
2,t
∂h > 0). Therefore, for all h > l
we have n∗
1,t < n∗
2,t < n < n∗∗
1,t < n∗∗
2,t.
Summing up, when δ < 1, h > l > 0 and T → +∞, we have n∗
1 < n∗












































Appendix A2: Fixed per-unit cost of sampling
36The decision at date T is the same as in Appendix A1. The rest of the proof follows
similar steps as in Appendix A1. We present only a sketch. At date T − 1, there are two
cases.
Case-1: n > n. ˜ V T−1
i (n)=max{xi(2µ(n) − 1);ν(n)˜ V T
i (n + 1) + (1 − ν(n))˜ V T
i (n − 1) − c}
and
˜ Y T−1
i (n) = max{0,ν(n)˜ Y T
i (n + 1) + (1 − ν(n))˜ Y T
i (n − 1) − c}
where ˜ Y T−1
i (n) is deﬁned on (n,+∞). The right-hand side (r.h.s.) of ˜ Y T−1
i (n) is de-
creasing in n, and therefore there exists a cutoﬀ ˜ n∗∗
i,T−1 such that for all n > ˜ n∗∗
i,T−1 then
τi,T−1 = a, and for all n ∈ [n, ˜ n∗∗
i,T−1) then τi,T−1 = w. The cutoﬀ is the solution of:
c = [xi + yi] · ˜ g(˜ n∗∗
i,T−1)
where ˜ g(˜ n∗∗
i,T−1) = (1 − ν(˜ n∗∗
i,T−1))(1 − 2µ(˜ n∗∗
i,T−1 − 1)). Note that ˜ g(n) is decreasing in n



















∂h . Then, for all h > l > 0,
we have ˜ n∗∗
1,T−1 = ˜ n∗∗
2,T−1.
Case-2: n 6 n. ˜ V T−1
i (n)=max{yi(1 − 2µ(n));ν(n)˜ V T
i (n + 1) + (1 − ν(n))˜ V T
i (n − 1) − c}
and
˜ WT−1
i (n) = max{0,ν(n) ˜ WT
i (n + 1) + (1 − ν(n)) ˜ WT
i (n − 1) − c}
where ˜ WT−1
i (n) is deﬁned on (−∞,n). The r.h.s. of ˜ WT−1
i (n) is increasing in n, and
therefore there exists a cutoﬀ ˜ n∗
i,T−1 such that for all n ∈ (˜ n∗
i,T−1,n] then τi,T−1 = w, and
for all n < ˜ n∗
i,T−1 then τi,T−1 = b. The cutoﬀ is solution of:
c = [xi + yi] · ˜ s(˜ n∗
i,T−1,δ)
where ˜ s(˜ n∗
i,T−1) = ν(˜ n∗
i,T−1)(2µ(˜ n∗
i,T−1 +1)−1). Again, diﬀerentiating with respect to xi,



















∂h . Then, for all
h > l > 0, we have ˜ n∗
1,T−1 = ˜ n∗
2,T−1.
The proof is completed using a similar recursive method as in Appendix A1.
Case-1: n > n. ˜ V t−1
i (n) = max{xi(2µ(n) − 1);ν(n)˜ V t
i (n + 1) + (1 − ν(n))˜ V t
i (n − 1) − c}
and
˜ Y t
i (n) = max{0,ν(n)˜ Y t+1
i (n + 1) + (1 − ν(n))˜ Y t+1
i (n − 1) − c}
˜ Y t−1
i (n) = max{0,ν(n)˜ Y t
i (n + 1) + (1 − ν(n))˜ Y t
i (n − 1) − c}
Suppose that the following assumptions (A1)-(A6) hold.
(A1): ˜ Y t
i (n) is non-increasing in n and there exists ˜ n∗∗
i,t such that τi,t = a if n > ˜ n∗∗
i,t and
τi,t = w if n ∈ [n, ˜ n∗∗
i,t).
(A2): ˜ Y t
i (n) > ˜ Y t+1
i (n) and therefore ˜ n∗∗
i,t > ˜ n∗∗
i,t+1.
(A3): ˜ Y t
i (n,xi) > ˜ Y t
i (n,x0
i) if xi > x0
i (and therefore ∂˜ n∗∗
i,t/∂xi > 0).
(A4): ˜ Y t
i (n,yi) > ˜ Y t
i (n,y0
i) if yi > y0
i (and therefore ∂˜ n∗∗
i,t/∂yi > 0).
(A5): ˜ Y t
i (n,c) 6 ˜ Y t
i (n,c0) if c > c0 (and therefore ∂˜ n∗∗
i,t/∂c < 0).
(A6): ˜ Y t
1(n) = ˜ Y t
2(n) when x1 = h, y1 = l, x2 = l and y2 = h (and therefore ˜ n∗∗
1,t = ˜ n∗∗
2,t).
Given (A1), the r.h.s. of ˜ Y t−1
i (n) is decreasing in n, so ˜ Y t−1
i (n) is non-increasing in n.
Therefore, there exists a unique cutoﬀ ˜ n∗∗
i,t−1 such that for all n > ˜ n∗∗
i,t−1 then τi,t−1 = a,
and for all n ∈ [n, ˜ n∗∗
i,t−1) then τi,t−1 = w. Also, given (A2), the r.h.s. of Y t−1
i (n) is greater
or equal than the r.h.s. of ˜ Y t
i (n) and therefore ˜ Y t−1
i (n) > ˜ Y t
i (n). Overall, both (A1) and
(A2) hold at date t − 1. Furthermore, ˜ n∗∗
i,t−1 > ˜ n∗∗
i,t. Now, denote:
˜ Y t−1
i (n,xi) = max{0,ν(n)˜ Y t
i (n + 1,xi) + (1 − ν(n))˜ Y t
i (n − 1,xi) − c}
˜ Y t−1
i (n,x0
i) = max{0,ν(n)˜ Y t
i (n + 1,x0
i) + (1 − ν(n))˜ Y t
i (n − 1,x0
i) − c}
By (A3), if xi > x0
i then ˜ Y t
i (n + 1,xi) > ˜ Y t
i (n + 1,x0
i) and ˜ Y t
i (n − 1,h) > ˜ Y t
i (n − 1,x0
i).
Therefore, ˜ Y t−1
i (n,h) > ˜ Y t−1
i (n,x0
i). This means that (A3) holds at date t − 1 and, as a
consequence, that ∂˜ n∗∗
i,t−1/∂xi < 0. Using a similar reasoning, it is immediate that (A4)
and (A5) also hold at t − 1 and therefore that ∂˜ n∗∗
i,t−1/∂yi > 0 and ∂˜ n∗∗
i,t−1/∂c < 0. Last,
given (A6), ˜ Y t
1(n) = ˜ Y t
2(n) and ˜ n∗∗
1,t−1 = ˜ n∗∗
2,t−1.
38Case-2: n 6 n. ˜ V t−1
i (n)=max{yi(1−2µ(n));ν(n)˜ V t
i (n+1)+(1−ν(n))˜ V t
i (n−1)−c} and
˜ Wt
i (n) = max{0,ν(n) ˜ Wt+1
i (n + 1) + (1 − ν(n)) ˜ Wt+1
i (n−1) − c}
˜ Wt−1
i (n) = max{0,ν(n) ˜ Wt
i (n + 1) + (1 − ν(n)) ˜ Wt
i (n − 1) − c}
Suppose that the following assumptions (A1’)-(A6’) hold.
(A1’): ˜ Wt
i (n) is non-decreasing in n and there exists ˜ n∗
i,t such that τi,t = b if n < ˜ n∗
i,t and
τi,t = w if n ∈ (˜ n∗
i,t,n].
(A2’): ˜ Wt
i (n) > ˜ Wt+1
i (n) and therefore ˜ n∗
i,t < ˜ n∗
i,t+1.
(A3’): ˜ Wt
i (n,xi) 6 ˜ Wt
i (n,x0
i) if xi > x0
i (and therefore ∂˜ n∗
i,t/∂xi < 0).
(A4’): ˜ Wt
i (n,yi) 6 ˜ Wt
i (n,y0
i) if yi > y0
i (and therefore ∂˜ n∗
i,t/∂yi < 0).
(A5’): ˜ Wt
i (n,c) > ˜ Wt
i (n,c0) if c > c0 (and therefore ∂˜ n∗
i,t/∂c > 0).
(A6’): ˜ Wt
1(n) = ˜ Wt
2(n) when x1 = h, y1 = l, x2 = l and y2 = h (and therefore ˜ n∗
1,t = ˜ n∗
2,t).
Given (A1’), the r.h.s. of ˜ Wt−1
i (n) is increasing in n, so ˜ Wt−1
i (n) is non-decreasing in
n. Therefore, there exists a unique cutoﬀ ˜ n∗
i,t−1 such that for all n < ˜ n∗
i,t−1 then τi,t−1 = b,
and for all n ∈ (˜ n∗
i,t−1,n] then τi,t−1 = w. Also, given (A2’), the r.h.s. of ˜ Wt−1
i (n) is
greater or equal than the r.h.s. of ˜ Wt
i (n) and therefore ˜ Wt−1
i (n) > ˜ Wt
i (n). Overall, both
(A1’) and (A2’) hold at date t − 1. Furthermore, ˜ n∗
i,t−1 < ˜ n∗
i,t. Now, denote:
˜ Wt−1
i (n,xi) = max{0,ν(n) ˜ Wt
i (n + 1,xi) + (1 − ν(n)) ˜ Wt
i (n − 1,xi) − c}
˜ Wt−1
i (n,x0
i) = max{0,ν(n) ˜ Wt
i (n + 1,x0
i) + (1 − ν(n)) ˜ Wt
i (n − 1,x0
i) − c}
By (A3’), if xi > x0
i then ˜ Wt
i (n+1,xi) 6 ˜ Wt
i (n+1,x0
i) and ˜ Wt




i (n,xi) 6 ˜ Wt−1
i (n,x0
i). This means that (A3’) holds at date t − 1 and,
as a consequence, that ∂˜ n∗
i,t−1/∂xi < 0. Using a similar reasoning, it is immediate that
(A4’) and (A5’) also hold at t−1 and therefore that ∂˜ n∗
i,t−1/∂yi < 0 and ∂˜ n∗
i,t−1/∂c > 0.
Last, given (A6’), ˜ Wt
1(n) = ˜ Wt
2(n) and ˜ n∗
1,t−1 = ˜ n∗
2,t−1.
39